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⋆
Certain classes of system-level risk depend partly on decentralized lay decision making. For
instance, an organization’s network security risk depends partly on its employees’ responses
to phishing attacks. On a larger scale, the risk within a financial system depends partly
on households’ responses to mortgage sales pitches. Behavioral economics shows that
lay decision makers typically depart in systematic ways from the normative rationality
of Expected Utility (EU), and instead display heuristics and biases as captured in the
more descriptively accurate Prospect Theory (PT). In turn psychological studies show
that successful deception ploys eschew direct logical argumentation and instead employ
peripheral-route persuasion, manipulation of visceral emotions, urgency, and familiar
contextual cues. The detection of phishing emails and inappropriate mortgage contracts
may be framed as a binary classification task. Signal Detection Theory (SDT) offers the
standard normative solution, formulated as an optimal cutoff threshold, for distinguishing
between good/bad emails or mortgages. In this paper we extend SDT behaviorally by
re-deriving the optimal cutoff threshold under PT. Furthermore we incorporate the
psychology of deception into determination of SDT’s discriminability parameter. With
the neo-additive probability weighting function, the optimal cutoff threshold under PT
is rendered unique under well-behaved sampling distributions, tractable in computation,
and transparent in interpretation. The PT-based cutoff threshold is (i) independent of loss
aversion and (ii) more conservative than the classical SDT cutoff threshold. Independently
of any possible misalignment between individual-level and system-level misclassification
costs, decentralized behavioral decision makers are biased toward under-detection, and
system-level risk is consequently greater than in analyses predicated upon normative
rationality.
KEY WORDS: system-level risk, Signal Detection Theory, Prospect Theory, psychology of
deception, spear phishing
1. INTRODUCTION
Computer networks and securitization markets
are examples of systems in which the self-interested
actions of lay decision makers contribute to the
severity of system-level risk. An organization’s net-
work security may be compromised from the staging
ground of individual user accounts. Hence overall
network security risk depends on individual users’
⋆
Department of Economics, Lancaster University, Lancaster
LA1 4YX, UK, k.kaivanto@lancaster.ac.uk
decision making in the face of phishing attacks.1
And in markets for securitized mortgage products,
the potential loss distribution depends in part on
individual homebuyers’ decisions to accept or reject
high-risk mortgage contracts.
So although much can be done to limit system-
1In a phishing attack, a network user receives an email
containing either an attachment or a website link, which if
opened, prompts the user to enter personal information (e.g.
passwords) or infects the user’s computer with malware that
records such information surreptitiously.
1 0272-4332/14/0100-0001$22.00/1 ✐C 2014 Society for Risk Analysis
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level risk through alignment of incentives and
technical and procedural protocols, ultimately it is
a collection of lay people – employees or customers
– whose individual decisions carry system-level
consequences. To render these decisions amenable to
modeling and incorporation into a formal risk model,
it is useful to frame the individual-level decisions
as binary classification tasks – between authentic
and malicious emails, or between appropriate and
inappropriate mortgage contracts.
In the Signal Detection Theory (SDT) formal-
ization of binary classification, the signal extracted
by an individual is represented by the magnitude of a
score variable. Higher values of this score variable are
associated with the malicious/inappropriate class.
Where the sampling distribution of a score variable
is known both under the null (benign) hypothesis as
well as under the alternative (malicious) hypothesis,
classical SDT identifies the optimal cutoff threshold
in this score variable for binary classification by
minimizing the expected cost of misclassification
errors, striking the optimal trade-off between the true
positive likelihood and the false positive likelihood
from among the set of feasible combinations. The
frontier of the latter feasible set is known as a
Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curve.
This analytical machinery is useful, particularly
as a benchmark for individuals who conform with
normative decision theory. However, ample and
robust experimental evidence shows that most
individuals do not conform with normative decision
theory, and instead display a variety of heuristics
and biases. (1) In this paper we re-derive the SDT
optimal cutoff threshold under the more descriptively
accurate objective function of Prospect Theory
(PT). (2)
The resulting new form of the optimal cutoff
threshold identifying expression differs from it
classical SDT precursor. Loss aversion does not
appear in this identifying expression. But due to the
PT value function, the ratio of the subjective impact
of the cost of Type I error to the subjective impact
of the cost of Type II error is greater in the PT-
based model than in the classical model. This leads to
a more conservative cutoff threshold having smaller
true positive and false positive likelihoods.
But the most striking features are due to the
non-linear probability weighting function. This (i)
introduces non-linearity into the objective function’s
contours, resulting in potential non-uniqueness of
optimal cutoff threshold recommendations, and (ii)
renders the cutoff threshold expression opaque to
interpretation and intractable for non-computer-
intensive calculation. Both of these complications
are resolved by the use of a linear-with-boundary-
discontinuities ‘neo-additive’ probability weighting
function.
Compared with PT-based behavioral decision
makers, assuming instead that individual network
users abide by normative decision theory entails
underestimation of system-level risk. When the
model is extended to account for the psychology of
deception, this underestimation of system-level risk
is even more pronounced. To illustrate the magnitude
and consequentiality of this underestimation for
system-level risk, we develop an SDT-based phishing-
risk model, which we evaluate using agent-based
simulation modeling under three sets of assump-
tions: non-behavioral SDT, PT-SDT, and PT-SDT
incorporating psychology-of-deception effects. These
simulation results reinforce and extend the insights
from comparative static analysis, and furthermore
showcase the potential for calibrated variants of the
type of modeling apparatus developed here to be
used instrumentally by Information Security Officers
for security-breach risk estimation.
Henceforth in this paper, the development is
couched in terms of the email classification problem.
Full treatment of the mortgage classification prob-
lem, employing the method and results developed
here, is deferred to subsequent work.
2. PHISHING LITERATURE PRE´CIS
This work bridges the interstices between several
strands of literature, some of which are in their
infancy. The model itself is developed within the
mature SDT framework (see Section 3). This is
‘behavioralized’ by substituting the classical optimal
cutoff threshold with one derived under Tversky and
Kahneman’s PT objective function (see Section 4).
PT, which formally is a generalization of Expected
Utility (EU), incorporates a number of the principal
findings of the ‘heuristics and biases’ literature:
framing, nonlinear probability weighting, source
dependence, risk aversion in gains, risk seeking in
losses, loss aversion, ambiguity aversion, and the
four-fold pattern of risk attitudes. (1,2) Within the
computer science literature, Ryan West is credited
with an early exploration of the implications of PT
for security, (3) closely followed by Ross Anderson and
Tyler Moore’s influential characterization of informa-
tion security as a field at the intersection between
computer science, economics and psychology. (4)
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West employs PT as a lens with which to
identify factors that have a bearing on the trade-
offs between security risks, losses and benefits. (3)
Pro-security actions typically involve sure immediate
costs (e.g. inconvenience, delay). Meanwhile, the
costs of security breaches are uncertain and occur in
the future. West observes that, due to the properties
of the PT value function, behavioral decision makers
are more likely to gamble on the possibility of not
having to face a security breach rather than incur
the sure immediate cost of a pro-security action. And
given that PT also embodies ‘loss aversion’ – i.e. that
losses loom larger than gains, generally by a factor
in excess of 2 – system designers must recognize
that although the inconvenience cost of a security
measure may be small, loss averse users will require
an off-setting benefit more than twice as large in
order to render the security measure psychologically
worthwhile. Thus, when examined through the lens
of PT, Cormac Herley’s finding – that “most security
advice simply offers a poor cost-benefit tradeoff to
users and is rejected” (5) – does not go far enough. For
loss averse behavioral users, even costs balanced one-
for-one with benefits are unattractive, and remain so
until the cost-benefit ratio drops below 12 .
For obvious reasons, much of the research
on phishing is computer-science centric. (6) But
the vulnerability that phishing and other ‘social
engineering’ hacks exploit is the human user, who
is a psychological and behavioral agent, rather than
axiomatically rational. Thus the thrust of research
has increasingly turned toward online trust, (7)
detection of deception, (8,9,10) and phenomena such
as dynamic inconsistency induced by hyperbolic
discounting. (11)
Online scams such as phishing employ the social
engineering techniques of persuasion and influence.
Rather than the direct, rational argumentation route
to persuasion, scams follow a peripheral route to
persuasion that largely bypasses logical processes.
Research in psychology has identified at least six
different factors that may be deployed in peripheral-
route persuasion: authority, scarcity, similarity and
identification, reciprocation, consistency following
commitment, and social proof. (12,13,14) As in le-
gitimate forms of marketing, scams emphasize the
urgency of the opportunity or required action. (15) If
urgency is taken at face value, then there is not time
to contemplate and ‘think on it’ as one would in the
direct route to persuasion. Furthermore, scammers
invoke a subset of visceral factors to override rational
deliberation and increase the relative desirability of
compliance. (16,15) Emotions such as greed, pity, lust,
fear and anxiety are visceral factors which, once
stirred up, act as a ‘stick’ if the associated need is
not met, and provide a ‘carrot’ when the need is met.
For instance, emails purportedly from the IRS which
inform the recipients of ‘Unreported/Underreported
Income (Fraud Application)’ are designed to trigger
fear and anxiety. But this emotionally charged,
viscerally motivated state does not persist long.
Hence scams invariably contrive compelling reasons
for immediate action. (16) In the words of a former
swindler “It is imperative that you work as quickly
as possible. Never give a hot mooch time to cool off.
You want to close him while he is still slobbering
with greed.” (17)
Embedding the phishing ploy within an email
containing rich recipient-specific contextual informa-
tion has become possible as digital footprints have
grown. This targeted and tailored approach is called
spear phishing, and it is typically the first stage of
an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) attack on
an organization’s sensitive information. Numerous
organizations – governmental, defense, corporate and
scientific – have been compromised in this manner,
including the White House, the Australian Govern-
ment, the Reserve Bank of Australia, the Canadian
Government, the Epsilon mailing list service, Gmail,
Lockheed Martin, Oak Ridge National Laboratory,
RSA SecureID, Coka Cola Co., and Chesapeake
Energy. (18,19,20,21) The contextual information in
spear-phishing emails enhances the effectiveness
of appeals to authority, credibility, similarity &
identification, reciprocation, consistency, and social
proof. Evidence for this enhancement comes not only
from the success of spear phishing ‘in the field’, but
also from controlled experiments. Jagatic et al. (22)
for instance found that merely spoofing emails so
as to appear to be sent by an individual that the
recipient recognizes causes a 4.5-fold increase in the
susceptibility to clicking a link in the malicious email.
When implemented well, a spear-phishing email
seemingly does not stand out among the target’s
legitimate emails.
What this literature pre´cis reveals is that
behavioral decision makers differ from their nor-
mative counterparts on two levels: (i) their trade-
offs between uncertainties, losses and benefits are
descriptively captured by PT rather than EU, and
(ii) their susceptibility to peripheral-route persua-
sion, visceral emotions, and disarming by familiar
cues introduces gaps into information processing,
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possibly even shifting the locus of attention away
from the key question of benign/malicious content
entirely. The former (i) is addressed below by re-
deriving SDT’s optimal cutoff threshold under the
PT objective function (see Section 4). The latter (ii)
is addressed by re-expressing the ROC curve as a
function of peripheral-route persuasion (see Section
5).
3. CLASSICAL SIGNAL DETECTION
THEORY
A binary classifier is sought for whether mali-
cious content is present (D) or absent (¬D). Fol-
lowing the standard SDT formulation, the problem
reduces to the determination of an optimal cutoff
threshold θ∗ ∈ Θ = [θ, θ] ⊂ R that identifies
the observed score θ as belonging either to the
acceptance interval (θ ≤ θ ≤ θ∗) associated
with acceptance of the null hypothesis H0 : ¬D
or to the rejection interval (θ∗ < θ ≤ θ) in
which the null hypothesis is rejected in favor
of the the alternative hypothesis H1 : D. The
optimal cutoff threshold is identified by applying
an optimality criterion – e.g. minimizing expected
cost, or maximizing expected utility – subject to
the error likelihoods being constrained by the ROC
curve. (24,23,25) Given that the scoring procedure
yields a different sampling distribution for θ under
the null than under the alternative, different cutoff
thresholds θ′ yield different Type I and Type II error
likelihoods (α, β).
Table I .: Likelihood assignments and associated
terminology
TNLθ′ = P (θ ≤ θ′|¬D) = (1 − αθ′ ) = Specificity
FPLθ′ = P (θ > θ
′|¬D) = αθ′ = Type I error likel.
TPLθ′ = P (θ > θ
′|D) = (1 − βθ′ ) = Sensitivity; Power
FNLθ′ = P (θ ≤ θ′|D) = βθ′ = Type II error likel.
For every scoring procedure each particular
threshold value θ′ defines a combination of True Neg-
ative Likelihood (TNL), False Positive Likelihood
(FPL), True Positive Likelihood (TPL) and False
Negative Likelihood (FNL), where the former pair
and the latter pair are complementary (FPLθ′ = 1−
TNLθ′ and TPLθ′ = 1− FNLθ′). Given that the
null and alternative hypotheses are operationalized
as H0 : θ ≤ θ′ and H1 : θ > θ′, the correspondences
in Table I hold.
The ROC curve for a scoring procedure plots the
TPLθ′ on the vertical axis of the unit square against
the FPLθ′ on the horizontal axis of the unit square
as the threshold θ′ is varied within its domain
(see Figure 1a). In other words the ROC curve
consists of the parametric plot of (FPLθ′ ,TPLθ′)
which results when the cutoff threshold is
allowed to vary within the support of the score
variable {(P (θ > θ′|¬D), P (θ > θ′|D)) : θ′ ∈ Θ}.
Sampling distributions that coincide everywhere
f(θ|¬D) = f(θ|D) ∀ θ ∈ Θ yield a classifier that
performs no better than chance; the ROC curve of
this classifier coincides with the diagonal. When
the sampling distributions of θ under ¬D and
D are unimodal, continuously differentiable and
F (θ|¬D) ≤ F (θ|D) ∀ θ ∈ Θ, the ROC curve
is everywhere differentiable and monotonically
decreasing in slope. The Area Under the Curve
(AUC) ranges from 12 for the random classifier to
AUC=1 for a perfectly discriminating classifier.
Where the score variable is normally distributed
with common variance in both negative θ ∼
N(µ¬D, σ
2) and positive θ ∼ N(µD, σ2) states with
µD ≥ µ¬D, then the discriminability index is defined
as
d′ =
µD − µ¬D
σ
. (3.1)
The greater the distance between the means of the
sampling distributions, the more discriminating the
signal and the larger the AUC. As d′ → 0, AUC→ 12 ;
and AUC → 1 as d′ →∞.
Denoting the direct cost of implementing the
generic scoring procedure as C and the costs
associated with true positives, false negatives, true
negatives and false positives as CTP, CFN, CTN
and CFP respectively, then the expected cost of
using the signal detection mechanism is of the form
E(C) = C+CTPP (TP)+CFNP (FN)+CTNP (TN)+
CFPP (FP). ROC curves are continuous, but need
not be everywhere differentiable. For ROC curves
that are differentiable, θ∗ identifies the point (FPLθ∗ ,
TPLθ∗) at which the iso-expected-cost line is tangent
to the ROC curve. We wish to minimize the expected
costs of implementing the decision criterion E(C)
subject to the TPL and FPL parameters being
constrained by the ROC curve, which for present
purposes we represent as the function TPL =
G(FPL).
min
θ′
E(C) s.t. TPL = G(FPL) (3.2)
The slope of each iso-expected-cost contour – and
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therefore also the slope of the cost minimizing iso-
expected-cost line at the optimal operating point
– is the ratio of expected opportunity cost of mis-
classifying an authentic email (¬D) to the expected
opportunity cost of misclassifying a malicious email
(D).
P (¬D)
P (D)
[
CFP − CTN
CFN − CTP
]
=
(
dTPL
dFPL
)
C¯∗
(3.3)
The optimal cutoff threshold is the θ∗ that generates
the point on the ROC curve (FPLθ∗ ,TPLθ∗) =
(P (θ > θ∗|¬D), P (θ > θ∗|D)) which satisfies the tan-
gency condition (3.3).
The square-bracketed term in (3.3) fixes the
manner in which misclassification costs affect the
optimal cutoff threshold. Only the cost difference
between the misclassification and the correct clas-
sification matters for optimal cutoff threshold place-
ment. Not, for instance, cost differences across the
authentic/malicious state divide. Similarly, the levels
of within-state costs are cutoff-threshold irrelevant;
only their difference matters, via the ratio across
states.
The slope of the iso-expected-cost contour (3.3)
is also the optimal critical likelihood ratio l∗ with
which to assign observed scores θ either to the
acceptance region or the rejection region according
to the likelihood ratio condition: if lD,¬D(θ) =
P (θ|D)
P (θ|¬D) < l
∗ then H0 : ¬D is accepted, or if
lD,¬D(θ) =
P (θ|D)
P (θ|¬D) ≥ l∗ then H0 : ¬D is rejected
in favour of H1 : D.
(24)
Classical signal detection theory recognizes that,
in general, the cost terms can be replaced by the
utilities of incurring such costs. Nevertheless this
possibility is neither widely explored nor widely
adopted within the broader literature.2 The standard
classical approach is to minimize expected cost.
4. APPLICATION OF PT TO SDT
4.1 Setup
Consider the generic prospect (x,p), com-
posed of m + n + 1 outcomes x(m+n+1×1) =
(x−m, ..., x0, ..., xn) where x−m < · · · < x0 <
· · · < xn and probabilities p(m+n+1×1) =
2Two exceptions may be noted. Ulehla (26) and Galanter (27)
“have proposed that deviations from the normative prescrip-
tions arise for asymmetrical payoff matrices when the utility
of money is a negatively accelerated function of the monetary
values included in the matrix”. (28)
(p−m, ..., p0, ..., pn). Under PT the preference value of
a prospect (x,p) is given by V (x,p) = V +(x,p) +
V −(x,p) where V + and V − are the contributions of
gains and losses respectively.
In the present framework we will be concerned
exclusively with the (mis)classification costs
CFN > CTP > CFP > CTN ≥ 0 , (4.1)
where ‘Negative’ denotes the benign classification
(¬D) and ‘Positive’ denotes the malicious classifi-
cation (D). It is natural to set CTN = 0, as there
are no follow-on ‘costs’ to opening a non-malicious
email. It is also natural that CFN is the largest
element in the set of misclassification costs, as failing
to detect and reject a malicious email has the worst
possible consequences in this context. In-between,
the ranking of CTP and CFP is unambiguous in
targeted and tailored ‘spear phishing’ forms of
attack. (18,19,20,21,22) Here False Positives involve non-
zero costs; beyond secure deletion, protocol requires
they be reported to and investigated by network
security personnel. Similarly True Positives must
also be reported and investigated, but in this case
the procedure is more intrusive, disruptive and
protracted.
This cost structure is shared by most signal
detection problems where identification of the D
state is consequential to the organism, individual,
or organization. This is the case for instance in
medical diagnosis. Furthermore, as Michael Shermer
has argued with regard to animal and human
evolution more broadly, false positives – believing
that there is a connection between A and B when
there is not – are usually harmless; in contrast, false
negatives – believing that there is no connection
between A and B when there is – may have
life- and procreation-threatening consequences. (29)
Note that, as this paper’s objective is to study
the effects of the behavioral nature of users, we
abstract from any possible misalignment of incentives
(i.e. misalignment of misclassification costs) between
users and the organization as a whole.
Due to (4.1), the present analysis is conducted
entirely within the loss domain, where the PT
preference value of a prospect is given by
V −(x,p) = w−(p−m)v
−(x−m)
+
m∑
k=1
[
w−
( k∑
j=0
p−(m−j)
)− w−( k−1∑
j=0
p−(m−j)
)]
× v−(x−(m−k)) (4.2)
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In accordance with widespread practice within
the PT literature, (30,31,32) we follow Tversky and
Kahneman (2) (TK92) in adopting a power-function
specification of the value function
v−(x) = −λ · (−x)φ− for x ≤ 0
φ− = 0.88 , λ = 2.25 (4.3)
and the single-parameter probability weighting func-
tion
w−(p) =
pδ
(pδ + (1−pδ))1/δ , δ = 0.69 . (4.4)
This combination of functional forms and parameters
has been obtained through maximum likelihood
estimation applied to laboratory experiment data.
However, these TK92 functional forms and param-
eters have also received support from ‘parameter-
free’ elicitation procedures. (39) They are the initial
defaults used in applications of PT.3
4.2 Optimal operating point under PT
As above, the email is either malicious (inap-
propriate) with prior probability p = P (D) or is
authentic with prior probability 1 − p = P (¬D) =
1− P (D). Conditional on the true state, the scoring
mechanism generates, for any given threshold θ′ ∈
[θ, θ], the classifications TN, FP, TP, FN according
to the probabilities outlined in Table I above. Then
the PT preference function (over the loss domain)
simplifies to
V −(C) = − w−(pβ)λ[v−(CFN)− v−(CTP)]
− w−(p)λ[v−(CTP)− v−(CFP)]
− w−(p+ (1−p)α)λ[v−(CFP)− v−(CTN)]
− w−(1)λv−(CTN) . (4.5)
Solving for the slope of iso-V −(C) contours
in ROC space (see Appendix for the
(
ψ1(α,β|p,δ)
ψ2(α,β|p,δ)
)
term):
dTPL
dFPL
=
[
(CFP)
φ−− (CTN)φ−
(CFN)φ
−− (CTP)φ−
](
ψ1(α, β|p, δ)
ψ2(α, β|p, δ)
)
(4.6)
There are two multiplicative bracketed terms in
(4.6). First, in the square brackets, the ratio of the
3http://prospect-theory.behaviouralfinance.net/
cpt-calculator.php,
http://psych.fullerton.edu/mbirnbaum/calculators/cpt_
calculator.htm
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Fig. 1: (a) ROC curves generated from θ ∼ N(1, 1)
under H0 and θ ∼ N(1.7, 1) and θ ∼ N(2.7, 1)
under H1. (b) Typical intermediate-range iso-V
−(C)
contours under the TK92 probability weighting
function.
penalty incurred for misclassification of authentic
emails to the penalty incurred for misclassification
of malicious emails. Here the ‘penalty’ is gauged
by the value function over negative outcomes (i.e.
costs) calculated with regard to the reference point
CTN = 0. Second, in the round brackets, a ratio
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term in probabilities, which here reflects not only
prior probability p, but also weighting of the prior
probability and misclassification likelihoods. The
form of this (weighted) probability term is complex;
it resists simplification, intuitive interpretation, as
well as manual computation. Hence in (4.6) the
term
(
ψ1(α,β|p,δ)
ψ2(α,β|p,δ)
)
stands as a place holder for the
complete expression presented in the Appendix.
Using numerical methods it may be shown
that the iso-V −(C) contours vary over a range
from nearly horizontal to nearly vertical, depending
on the parameter values. At the near-vertical and
near-horizontal extremes, the contours are have
less curvature and are approximately linear. In
the intermediate range however, the contours are
characterized by pronounced curvature, as illustrated
in Figure 1b. This curvature of the iso-V −(C)
contours introduces the possibility, depending on the
shape of the ROC curve, of non-uniqueness of the
(FPL,TPL)= (α, (1−β)) point identified as optimal.
Note that the loss aversion parameter λ cancels
out of the iso-V −(C) contour slope expression (4.6).
The square bracketed classical misclassification
cost ratio term in equation (3.3) is smaller than the
corresponding square-bracketed term in (4.6). Recall
that CTN = 0, and define the remaining cost terms
with the constants {ci ∈ (1,∞] ⊂ R, i = 2, 3, 4} such
that CTN = 0 < CFP = c2 < CTP = c2c3 < CFN =
c2c3c4. Recalling that φ
− < 1, it follows that[
(CFP)
φ− − (CTN)φ−
(CFN)φ
− − (CTP)φ−
]
>
[
CFP − CTN
CFN − CTP
]
. (4.7)
Thus for a PT decision maker whose probability
distortion is vanishingly small δ → 1, the value
function curvature over the domain of losses causes
the iso-V −(C) contours to be steeper than the iso-
E(C) contours in the classical (risk-neutral) case.
4.3 Neo-additive probability weighting
function
The principal shortcomings of the above PT
implementation of SDT – namely (i) potential non-
uniqueness of the optimal cutoff threshold, and
(ii) opaqueness to interpretation as well as manual
calculation – may be ameliorated by substitution of
a piece-wise linear neo-additive probability weight-
ing function for the TK92 probability weighting
function. There are numerous precedents for its
use. (34,35,36,37) Viscusi and Evans (38) present em-
pirical evidence for its use, while Abdellaoui (39,40)
provides parameter estimates. Wakker notes that
neo-additive weighting functions “are among the
most promising candidates regarding the optimal
tradeoff of parsimony and fit”. (41) They capture
both the possibility effect, at the transition from
impossibility (p = 0) to possibility (p > 0), as
well as the certainty effect, at the transition from
highly likely to certain (p = 1). In-between the
two extremes, the linear form overweights small
probabilities and underweights large probabilities.
wn-a(p) =


0 for p = 0
a p+ b for 0 < p < 1
1 for p = 1
0 ≤ b < 1, 0 < a ≤ 1−b (4.8)
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1
p
w(p)
•
•
Fig. 2: Probability weighting functions: TK92
(dashed, red); Neo-additive (solid, blue).
We substitute the neo-additive weighting func-
tion (4.8) into (4.5) and solve for the slope of the
iso-V −n-a(C) contours in ROC space:
dTPL
dFPL
=
[
(CFP)
φ− − (CTN)φ−
(CFN)φ
− − (CTP)φ−
]
·
(
1− p
p
)
(4.9)
As is evident from the form of (4.9), the iso-V −n-a(C)
contours are straight lines, just as the iso-E(C)
contours of classical SDT. This ensures uniqueness
of the optimal cutoff threshold under this criterion
when the sampling distributions of θ conditional
on ¬D and D respectively are well behaved,
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yielding everywhere-differentiable ROC curves with
monotonically decreasing slope.
The second product term on the rhs in the
round brackets is simply the odds of the authentic
(appropriate) state P (¬D)P (D) . This is precisely the
manner in which prior probabilities entered the
slope of the iso-expected-cost contour expression in
classical SDT (3.3). Thus it is not overweighting
(underweighting) of small (large) probabilities in
itself that is responsible for (i) potential non-
uniqueness of the ‘optimal’ cutoff threshold and (ii)
the lack of tractability of the expression for iso-
V −(C) contour slope (4.6). Rather, these features
are consequences of the non-linearity in the TK92
probability weighting function. From the standpoint
of optimal operating point uniqueness, the problem
is that there is not sufficient regularity in the iso-
V −(C) contours to ensure that there will be, for one
and only one contour, either (i) only one boundary
intersection point, or (ii) only one interior tangency
point.
The term in square brackets in (4.9) is identical
to the corresponding term in (4.6). Hence, as shown
in (4.7), the square-bracketed term in (4.9) is larger
than the corresponding term in classical SDT. It
follows from the properties of the square- and
round-bracketed terms together that the iso-V −
n-a
(C)
contours are steeper than the iso-E(C) contours.
Thus PT-SDT under the neo-additive probability
weighting function yields a more conservative cutoff
threshold than classical SDT.
5. PSYCHOLOGY OF DECEPTION AND
SDT
Some deceptive ploys are more likely to succeed
than others. The literature reviewed in Section 2
identifies four categories of psychological factors that
have been linked to successful deception: peripheral-
route persuasion, visceral emotions, urgency, and
contextual cues. All other things considered equal,
the more skillful the perpetrator and the more effort
and resources used to craft a tailored, psychologically
and contextually compelling deception ploy, the more
likely the ploy will be successful.
Yet in order to progress with model building, it is
necessary to concede that all other things cannot be
considered equal. In this vein, we distinguish between
(i) the quality of the match and (ii) the quality of the
implementation.
5.1 Match quality
Not every phishing-ploy type – no matter how
well implemented – will have equal traction with all
users. For instance, an appeal to authority is 100%
ineffective on a user who has an antagonistic relation-
ship with authority. Similarly, not all implementation
choices will be equally effective on all users. Consider
the attempt to trigger the visceral emotion of greed
through the device of ‘lottery millions’; this will
be 100% ineffective on a devout Muslim user, as
gambling is haram (sinful, forbidden).
Individual phishing emails are comprised of a
bundle of cues, some reflecting the chosen phishing-
ploy type, others reflecting implementation choices.
Although there will therefore be a finite, discrete
combination of cues comprising each bundle, we
will define the match quality as a continuous index
between zero and one m ∈ [0, 1].
Let the space of possible cue combinations be
represented as Γ = {0, 1}z, where z ∈ N is the finite
total number of possible cues under consideration.
Let γ ∈ Γ be the combination of cues contained in
the phishing email, where ||γ||0 is the number of
cues.4 In turn, let hi ∈ [0, 1]z be user i’s z-vector
of indices, one for each cue hij ∈ [0, 1], j = 1, 2, ..., z,
documenting the quality each potential cue’s match
with user i. The phishing email’s global match
quality with user i is therefore given by the function
m : [0, 1]z × {0, 1}z → [0, 1], that is
mi = m(hi,γ) . (5.1a)
For risk simulation purposes it proves unnec-
essary to fully specify the space of cues Γ and
to define match quality as a function of hi and
γ as in equation (5.1a). Notice that this (5.1a)
approach would require hi to be defined explicitly
for each user and γ to be defined explicitly for
each phishing email. Also notice that the quality
of the correspondence between γ and hi will
have a random component because (i) the attacker’s
knowledge of hi is incomplete and (ii) the attacker
designs the phishing email to be effective across
a number of users. In the limiting case of a
focused spear-phishing attack targeting a single user,
(ii) ceases to be a source of randomness, but (i)
still remains. Hence we may abstract from the
particularistic details of specific cue sets and their
matches with specific individuals, and instead model
4|| · ||0 is the l0-norm, which returns the number of non-zero
elements in the vector.
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match quality as a transformation m : [0, 1]→ [0, 1]
of the standard uniform random variable ξ:
m = m(ξ) where ξ ∼ U(0, 1) . (5.1b)
This specification relies on the function m(·) to
capture the mapping of random draws from U(0, 1)
to the match quality scale. Three classes of mappings
are apposite. First, the class of cumulative distri-
bution functions of continuous, everywhere differen-
tiable probability density functions. A particularly
flexible exemplar of this category is the cumulative
Beta distribution
m(ξ) =
1
B(η, ϑ)
∫ ξ
0
tη−1(1− t)ϑ−1dt ,
η, ϑ ∈ R++ , (5.2)
where B(η, ϑ) is the Beta function. The flexibility of
the cumulative Beta function mapping is illustrated
in Figure (3a). Extreme match quality patterns are
also accommodated by this function. For instance
with the location parameter held small (η = 0.5), the
cumulative Beta function attains the value of 0.95 for
ξ = 0.038 when the scale parameter is set to ϑ = 50.
Under this mapping, the achieved match quality is
very high for all but the lowest values of ξ. With η
large and ϑ small, the opposite pattern (i.e. very
poor match quality for all but the highest values
of ξ) may be represented. And for balanced (η, ϑ)
combinations, the relationship between m(ξ) and
ξ approaches identity for low values of the location
and scale parameters. For high-and-balanced (η, ϑ)
combinations, m(ξ) sharply distinguishes between
below-average and above-average values of ξ.
The second class of mappings is illustrated
with the orange (dashed) line in Figure (3b). This
piecewise-linear class is straightforward in calcu-
lation yet approximates the S-shaped cumulative
distribution function form.
Finally, the third class of ‘bang-bang’ mappings
is illustrated with the magenta (dotted) line in
Figure (3b). In this particular (ξ′ = 0.95 threshold)
bang-bang mapping, 95% of phishing emails suffer
match-quality failure (m = 0), while only the top
5% achieve the required match precision (m = 1).
Notice that the transition threshold’s placement is
not restricted in principle, i.e. ξ′ ∈ [0, 1], but those
in the neighborhood of ξ′ = 0.95 are particularly
useful for modeling purposes, as they focus entirely
on good-quality matches, which are a small subset
of all possible pairings. A model based on a bang-
bang mapping with ξ′ = 0.95 is conservative in the
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Fig. 3: (a) Match quality mappings from the
cumulative Beta distribution. (b) Piecewise-linear
match quality mappings.
sense that it focuses on the good matches – which
also occur in mappings such as those illustrated
with the red line in Figure (3a) – but excludes a
large number of intermediate-quality matches. This
mapping simplifies and clarifies the interpretation of
simulation modeling, as will be seen below in Section
6.
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5.2 Implementation quality
Under certain assumptions, the AUC of an ROC
curve gives a direct reading of the probability that
a randomly selected positive will have a higher
score value than a randomly selected negative
AUC = P (θD > θ¬D).
(24) For normally distributed
equal-variance sampling distributions, the AUC is a
function of the discrimination parameter d ′, which
is the normalized distance between the means of
the two sampling distributions (see equation (3.1)).5
Denoting the deception perpetrator’s skill6 in deploy-
ing and manipulating peripheral-route persuasion,
visceral emotion, and contextual cues by K ∈ R+,
the amount of effort (time, exertion and resources)
used in crafting the deception ploy by e ∈ R+,
and the mark’s accumulated experience and learning
by Eit ∈ R+, then we can express the mark i’s
discrimation at time t with the differentiable function
d : R+ × R+ × R+ → R where
d ′it = d(K, e, Eit) . (5.3)
The time subscript t is necessary to reflect mark
i’s possibilities for gaining experience and learning
to identify particular classes of ploys. The mark’s
discrimination on a ploy perpetrated at time t < τ ,
where τ is when the mark learns to dispassionately
recognize that ploy type, will be smaller than at any
time t > τ .7
When d ′ > 0 then AUC> 12 , and when d
′ < 0
then AUC< 12 . Normally in SDT, ROC curves that
do less well than chance (AUC< 12 ) are not employed
in modeling, as it is possible to increase classification
success simply by noting that these ROC curves
identify non-positives rather than positives, and that
those not identified are therefore positives. However,
in extremis, deception ploys may be engineered to
be very effective. Therefore in principle we may wish
to admit all AUC∈ [0, 1] and dAUC
dd ′
> 0 within
this range. But for simplicity we henceforth limit
analysis to AUC≥ 12 and d ′ ≥ 0. The attacker’s first-
partial derivatives in (5.3) are non-positive (K ′, e′ ≤
5We wish to thank one of the Reviewers for pointing out
that the term ‘discriminability’ is awkward and that its
literal meaning may be confusing. Henceforth we diverge from
prevailing convention within the SDT literature and refer to
‘discrimination’ rather than ‘discriminability’.
6i.e. human capital
7Although we track the progress of experience and learning,
we do not endogenize learning within the present model, as
the primary objective is to investigate the effect of behavioral
factors on system-level risk.
0) and second-partial derivatives are non-negative
(K ′′, e′′ ≥ 0). The contribution from the mark’s
experience is opposite, i.e. E ′ ≥ 0, E ′′ ≤ 0. Hence
dAUC
dd ′
∂d ′
∂K
≤ 0 , dAUC
dd ′
∂d ′
∂e
≤ 0 , dAUC
dd ′
∂d ′
∂E ≥ 0 ,
∀ d ′ > 0 . (5.4)
Ideally it would be desirable to express
deception-ploy-specific AUC or d ′ as a function
of individual peripheral-route persuasion factors
(authority, scarcity, similarity and identification,
reciprocation, consistency following commitment,
and social proof), urgency, visceral factors (greed,
pity, lust, fear, and anxiety), and mark-specific
contextual cues. However, it is not well-understood
what the natural measures or ordinal indices are for
all of these factors, and the – presumably complex
and non-linear – interactions between these factors
are not fully mapped out in the academic literature.
Against this background, (5.3) and (5.4) may be
viewed as parsimoniously organizing and presenting
the upper effectiveness envelope of these (numerous)
interacting deception-ploy elements.
The comparative statics are straightforward. For
instance, an individual network user who achieves
high discrimination within a particular phishing for-
mat will have an ROC curve with more pronounced
curvature (and larger AUC) than an individual
who has lower discrimination. Consequently, the
difference between the classical (3.3) and PT (4.9)
optimal trade-offs entails that the magnitude of
the bias inherent in incorrectly assuming normative
rationality is larger for agents with a lower discrim-
ination index, i.e. those with lower ROC curvature
and AUC. In other words, PT-SDT shifts the
optimal cutoff threshold θ∗ and optimal operating
point (α∗, (1 − β∗)) more for agents with lower
ROC curvature and AUC. Thus the psychology of
deception magnifies the effect of behavioral decision
making under risk and uncertainty.
5.3 Joint effect
In the absence of psychology-of-deception effects,
the user’s discrimination parameter is uncompro-
mised
d
′
it = d(0, 0, Eit) . (5.5)
When the cues present in a phishing email suc-
cessfully match the user perfectly, then the user’s
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discrimination parameter is compromised
d ′it = d(K, e, Eit) . (5.6)
Dropping subscripts where possible, we may define
the effective discrimination parameter d ′e from
(5.1b), (5.5) and (5.6) as the match-quality weighted
convex combination of the compromised d ′ and
uncompromised d
′
discrimination parameters.
d ′e = m · d ′ + (1 −m) · d
′
(5.7)
Note that if the cue-match between the phishing
email and the user is perfect (m = 1), then the
user’s effective discrimination parameter is simply his
compromised discrimination parameter.
6. SYSTEM-LEVEL RISK MODELING
6.1 Approach
The individual-level comparative statics pre-
sented in Sections 4 and 5 show the direction that
cutoff thresholds shift under the influence of behav-
ioral factors. But these comparative statics do not
answer the system-level question: Are the individual-
level behavioral effects quantitatively consequential at
the level of the whole network?
Agent-Based Modeling (ABM) is particularly
suited to answering this type of question. Here we
implement a demonstration-of-principle intended to
quantify the distinction between networks consisting
of normatively rational users and networks consisting
of behavioral users. Nevertheless it is not solely
of academic interest. The probability of a network
security breach is the disjunction8 of the probabilities
with which individual users are successfully phished.
It is known, however, that disjunctive probabilities
are under-weighted in intuitive human probability
reasoning. (42,1) Wherever Information Security Offi-
cers9 assess network security risk qualitatively, such
under-weighting (bias) is a behavioral possibility.
Calibrated variants of the type of modeling appa-
ratus developed here may be used instrumentally by
Information Security Officers for unbiased security-
breach risk estimation.
8logical OR operator, ∨
9or holders of the closely related job titles of Information
Assurance Officer, Information Security Risk Manager or
Security Officer
6.2 Structure and notation
The basic structure of the model specifies the set
of users and their exposure to phishing email. The
set of network users is I, with cardinality I = |I|
denoting the number of users, whereby the individual
users are indexed as i ∈ {1, 2, ..., I}. For present
purposes, the number of users is held fixed at I =
100. All users are held to be average, receiving 50
emails per working day that pass through the spam
filter, totalling 250 emails per working week. We
assume that for each user, 1 spear-phishing email
passes through the organization’s spam filter without
detection each week. As a proportion, 1250 = 0.004
of all emails reaching users’ in-boxes are malicious.
Weeks are indexed as t ∈ {1, 2, ..., T }. We assume
that the duration of a spear-phishing attack is three
weeks, T = 3. In accordance with equation (5.3),
a user i who fails to reject a malicious email in
week τ will, as a result of the experience and the
attendant attention, drastically improve her ability
to detect this morphology of phishing email, yielding
AUCit ≈ 1 ∀ t ∈ {τ+1, τ+2, ..., T }.
After experimentation with the model, an exem-
plar cost structure was found that allows the proper-
ties of the model to be illustrated most clearly. This
cost structure – which is not implausible – reflects
the network user’s experience of the costs of (mis-
)classifying spear-phishing emails. For the network
user, the consequences of erroneously responding to
a spear-phishing email are pre-eminent, by a large
margin. Hence we fix CFN = 20, CTP = 0.5, CFP =
0.25, CTN = 0. Furthermore, as a starting point for
the benchmark model, we assume that users expect
to receive on average one spear-phishing email per
day, i.e. a p = 5250 =
1
50 prior probability.
10
The fraction of behavioral users b whose decision
making is best described by PT is an empirical
question specific to each organization. But in order
to bring the distinction between normative and
behavioral into sharp relief, we focus on the extremes:
b ∈ {0, 1}.
To capture the psychology of deception as
described in Sections 2 and 5, we employ a simplified,
discretized operationalization that implements the
bang-bang match-quality mapping. Let the match
quality of the psychological deception ploy at time
t with user i be determined by the Bernoulli random
variable Xit. We specify the users’ compromised and
10The consequences of varying this parameter are explored in
Section 6.3.2.
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uncompromised discrimination parameters as d ′ ∈
R+ and d
′ ∈ R+ respectively, with 0 ≤ d ′ < d ′.
Conditional on successful cue-match (see Sections 5.1
and 5.3) indicated by xit = 1, the discrimination
parameter drops to the low value of d ′it = d
′, while
conditional upon cue mis-match indicated by xit =
0, the discrimination parameter remains at d ′it =
d
′
. Techniques for empirically estimating ˆAUC and
therefore dˆ ′ are well established. (23,24,25) For present
purposes we fix d ′ = 0.5 (AUC=0.638) and d
′
=
3.0 (AUC=0.983). When the attacker fails to achieve
high cue-match quality, users’ discrimination is high.
Probability pi can therefore be defined as pi := P (x =
1) = P (d ′) and (1− pi) := P (x = 0) = P (d ′). We fix
pi = 0.05. We feel that 5% is a conservative estimate
– in the sense of being closer to the lower bound
than to the upper bound – of the total population
fraction upon which a psychological deception ploy
gains at least some traction (see e.g. the red and
blue match-quality functions in Figure (3a)). Note
finally that these (population-level) probabilities are
not directly accessible to individual decision makers,
and consequently are not endogenized by individual
decision makers.
Using these assumptions we conduct three
separate anlyses, comparisons between which allow
quantification of the network-level consequential-
ity of individual-level behavioral effects. Firstly,
the benchmark scenario of normative rationality
(model M0). Secondly, the behavioral decision-
making effects codified by PT-SDT (model M1).
Thirdly, the PT-SDT behavioral decision-making
effects combined with the psychology-of-deception
effects on discrimination (model M2). Finally, we run
two further analyses to determine the independent
effects of varying the network users’ prior probability
p (Section 6.3.2) and discrimination d′ (Section
6.3.3).
The NetLogo model with which these analyses
are implemented is available at Modelling Com-
mons.11
6.3 Results
6.3.1 Benchmark model
Table II summarizes the distribution of security
breaches under each model when network users
are subjected to a simulated 3-week spear-phishing
11http://modelingcommons.org/browse/one_model/3912
attack. In this outcome variable the models are
ordered in each of their j ∈ {1, 2, 3} quartiles
QM0
j
< QM1
j
≤ QM2
j
∀j ∈ {1, 2, 3} (6.1)
as well as in their means
µˆM0 < µˆM1 < µˆM2 . (6.2)
Figure 4 illustrates the frequency and cumula-
tive distributions of the three models. Inspection
indicates a first-order stochastic dominance relation-
ship between model M1 and model M0. Between
model M2 and model M1, first-order stochastic
dominance also holds down to a 0.1%-quantile-
increment granularity.12 Considered separately (or
alternatively, by transitivity) model M2 first-order
stochastically dominates model M0. Note that since
the outcome variable is the count of security
breaches, the stochastically dominated model has the
lower security risk.
Table II .: Distribution of security breaches in 10,000
repetitions of a 3-week attack.
M0 M1 M2
Min. 3.0 6.0 6.0
Q1 12.0 17.0 17.0
Q2 14.0 20.0 20.0
µˆ 14.0 19.7 23.9
Q3 16.0 22.0 24.0
Max. 29.0 37.0 80.0
The parameters for this benchmark simulation
were chosen in part to reveal the differences between
the three models. Accordingly, the mixture distribu-
tion generated by model M2 is particularly evident
in Figure 4. This reflects the psychology-of-deception
effects (drastically weakened discrimination) among
a subset of network users, which magnify the
behavioral decision making effects already incor-
porated into PT-SDT. The 5% bang-bang match-
quality mapping places a stringent match-quality
12With quantile increments of 0.01%, which register each of
the 10,000 observations individually, unrestricted first-order
stochastic dominance would hold but for 4 quantiles in the
extreme left tail: 0.01%, 0.02%, 0.24% and 0.25%. In their work
on statistical testing for stochastic dominance, Davidson and
Duclos point out that “...testing for unrestricted dominance
is too statistically demanding, since it forces comparisons
of dominance curves over areas where there is too little
information.” (43) Hence the emphasis on restricted tests that
censor the tails.
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Fig. 4: Frequency and cumulative distributions of
security breaches under models M0–M2 in 10,000
repetitions of a 3-week spear-phishing campaign.
requirement on the phishing emails, resulting in
either fully compromised discrimination (the mi-
nority) or completely uncompromised discrimination
(the majority). Under any of the other match-
quality mappings illustrated in Figure 3, the effective
discrimination parameter (5.7) takes intermediate
values d ′e ∈ (d ′, d
′
) as well, thereby adding density
to and filling the valley between model M2’s major
and minor modes.
Notice that the minor mode comprises more than
5% of the combined distribution. This is because each
attack has a 3-week duration, and those users who
did not commit a False Negative misclassification
error in week 1 become subjected once more in
week 2 to a 5% cue-match success rate psychological
deception ploy. And in week 3, those users who did
not commit a False Negative misclassification error
in week 1 or week 2 are subjected to the 5% cue-
match success rate psychological deception ploy for a
final time. Since the total number of phishing emails
over the three weeks is 300, we can compute the
expected fraction of these 300 classification tasks to
be conducted under the compromised discrimination
parameter d ′. Denoting the proportion of users (out
of 100) committing a False Negative misclassification
error in week k ∈ {1, 2, 3} by ϕk ∈ (0, 1),
the expected share of all classification tasks to be
conducted under the compromised discrimination
parameter is:
pi(3 − 2ϕ1 − ϕ2) . (6.3)
The term in brackets will be greater than 1 if 23 > ϕ1
and ϕ1 ≥ ϕ2. So for the parameter combinations
employed here, the greater-than-5% share observed
in model M2’s minor mode is not in itself anomalous.
Table III .: Probability that there will be in excess of
10, 15, 20, 25 and 30 security breaches.
P·(z˜ >10) P·(z˜ >15) P·(z˜ >20) P·(z˜ >25) P·(z˜ >30)
(1.) M0 0.85 0.32 0.03 0.002 0.000
(2.) M1 0.99 0.85 0.41 0.075 0.005
(3.) M2 0.99 0.86 0.47 0.194 0.128
(4.) (2.)-(1.) 0.14 0.53 0.38 0.073 0.005
(5.) (3.)-(1.) 0.14 0.54 0.44 0.192 0.128
Empirical Cumulative Distribution Functions
(CDFs) as in Subfigure (4b) form the basis for
calculating the probability that there will be more
than z ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., I} security breaches. This
probability may be computed as PMj(z˜ > z) =
1 − FˆMj(z) for j ∈ {0, 1, 2}. Table III presents
this probability, calculated for each model and for
each of five different security-breach-count levels z =
(10, 15, 20, 25, 30). Rows four and five report the
bias – in terms of under-estimated security breach
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probability – of assuming normatively rational
network users instead of PT-SDT behavioral decision
makers (row 4) or instead of PT-SDT decision
makers subject to psychology-of-deception effects
(row 5). These last two rows of Table III show that
the bias involved in assuming normative rationality
is non-trivial.
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Fig. 5: Magnitude of under-estimate (bias) in
calculating PM0(z˜ > z) when in fact the descriptively
accurate model is M1 (green line) or M2 (blue line).
As Figure 5 shows,13 this under-estimation bias
reaches its supremum at z=16. Calculating PM0(z˜ >
16) when the true model is M1 under-estimates by
P = 0.5568 the probability that there will be more
than 16 security breaches. Calculating PM0(z˜ > 16)
when the true model is M2 under-estimates by P =
0.5748 the probability that there will be more than
16 security breaches. In other words, individual-level
behavioral effects are substantial and quantitatively
consequential for network-level risk assessment.
Note that this peak bias is also equal to the
statistic D−no,nj on samples of size n0 = nj = n
where j ∈ {1, 2}:
PMj(z˜ > 16)− PM0(z˜ > 16)
= (1−FˆMj(16))− (1−FˆM0(16))
= FˆM0(16)− FˆMj(16)
= sup
z∈I
{
FˆM0,n0(z)− FˆMj,nj (z)
}
= D−n0,nj . (6.4)
The two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is a test
13Note that Figure 5 does not present probability distribu-
tions; the area under each curve need not equal unity.
of the null hypothesis that both samples are drawn
from the same distribution, and it employs a test
statistic that is proportional to D−n0,nj , the largest
positive difference between empirical CDF under
normative rationality FˆM0,n0(z) and the empirical
CDF that reflects behavioral effects FˆMj,nj (z). Table
IV presents the difference D−nj ,nk , the K-S test
statistic, and associated one-sided p-value in columns
2–4. The hypothesis that samples of size nj and nk
are drawn from a common distribution is rejected for
j ∈ {0, 1}, k ∈ {1, 2}, j 6= k.
Following McFadden, (44) a test for whether FˆMk
first-order stochastically dominates FˆMj using two
independent samples of identical size nj = nk = n
may be formalized as the test of the null hypothesis
H0 : FˆMj,nj (z) ≥ FˆMk,nk(z) for all z against the
alternative of H1 : FˆMj,nj (z) < FˆMk,nk(z) for some
z, with a significance level given by the probability
of rejecting H0 when FMj ≡ FMk. McFadden’s test
statistic is
D∗n = sup
z∈I
√
n
(
FˆMk,nk(z)− FˆMj,nj (z)
)
, (6.5)
which has a significance level P (D∗n > q) with the
large-n limiting distribution of
P (D∗n > q) ⋍ e
−q2
(
1− q
3
√
2
n
+O(1/n)
)
. (6.6)
Table IV presents McFadden’s test statistic and its
associated p-value in columns 5–6. The null hypothe-
sis that FˆMk first-order stochastically dominates FˆMj
fails to be rejected in all three instances.
6.3.2 Prior probability
Figure 6 illustrates the relationship between (i)
the network user’s prior probability of receiving
a spear-phishing email and (ii) the distribution
of network breaches, ceteris paribus. In the p =
1/250 prior probability cell of Subfigure (6a) it is
notable that in 26.8% of the 10,000 repetitions, all
100 network users fall victim to the 3-week spear-
phishing attack. In the opposite extreme cell of
Subfigure (6a), which pictures the prior probability
p = 10/250 case, only 0.01% of the 10,000 repetitions
involve 20 or more network users falling victim to
the 3-week spear-phishing attack. A prior probability
equivalent to expecting on average two spear-
phishing emails per weekday (10/250) is sufficient to
mitigate the pi=0.05 psychology-of-deception effect
on the distribution of network breaches.
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Table IV .: Peak underestimation bias, Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) tests, and First-Order Stochastic Dominance
(FOSD) tests.
Kolmogorov-Smirnov McFadden FOSD test
Mj instead of Mk Bias peak statistic one-sided statistic one-sided
j∈{0,1}, k∈{1,2}, j 6=k D−nj ,nk
√
nD−nj ,nk p-value D
∗
n p-value
M0 instead of M1 0.5568 55.68 0.000 0.00 0.999
M0 instead of M2 0.5748 57.48 0.000 0.00 0.999
M1 instead of M2 0.1246 12.46 0.000 0.01 0.999
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Fig. 6: Effect of prior probability (ranging from 1/250 to 10/250) on the frequency and cumulative distributions
of security breaches in 10,000 repetitions of a 3-week spear-phishing campaign.
As equation (A.11) in the Appendix shows, the
prior probability p affects the optimal cutoff thresh-
old θ∗ nonlinearly, via a logarithmic transformation.
Replacing p = 10/250 with p = 1/250 shifts the
optimal cutoff threshold to the right by 2.339µD , which
is △θ∗ = 2.3393 = 0.78 under d
′ = 3 but △θ∗ =
2.339
0.5 = 4.68 under d
′ = 0.5. For d′ < 1 the effect
of △p on θ∗ is magnified, and lim
d′→0
△θ∗ =∞. The
statistical power of the SDT and PT-SDT classifiers
respond as lim
d′→0
(1 − β) = 0. This is because, as
d′ → 0, the optimal operating point converges to
the boundary (α∗, (1−β∗)) = (0, 0) when the slope of
the iso-expected-cost lines (3.3) or iso-V −
n-a
(C) lines
(4.9) exceed unity.
Thus we have elaborated, through numerical
analysis, what was found through theoretical analysis
in Section 5: that smaller d′ cause the impact of a
change in the optimal operating trade-off – whatever
the source of this change – to be manifested in
a larger shift in the optimal cutoff threshold. The
psychology of deception – which for some network
users drastically diminishes discrimination – magni-
fies not only the effect of behavioral decision making
under risk and uncertainty, but also the effect of
individuals’ private beliefs (prior probability) about
the likelihood of being targeted by a sophisticated
spear-phishing email.
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Fig. 7: Effect of discrimination, ranging from d′=1 to d′=4, on the frequency and cumulative distributions of
security breaches in 10,000 repetitions of a 3-week spear-phishing campaign on model M2 network users.
6.3.3 Discrimination
Figure 7 illustrates the effect of varying un-
compromised discrimination d′, ceteris paribus,14
through the sequence of values d′ = (1, 2, 3, 4).
These values correspond to the AUC values AUC=
(0.760, 0.921, 0.983, 0.998). All but the d′ = 1
frequency distributions have a second, minor mode
to the right of the major mode. For d′=4, truncating
the distribution to exclude the minor mode yields a
mean of µˆ|z≤18=7.02, which equates to 2.34 security
breaches on average per week of the spear-phishing
campaign. In turn the minor mode, which comprises
8.37% of all spear-phishing campaigns, has a mean
of µˆ|z>18=49.92.
The d′ = 1 cell of Subfigure (7a) reinforces what
was seen in the p = 10/250 cell of Subfigure (6a):
that observing a uni-modal empirical distribution is
not sufficient in itself to rule out the existence of an
underlying finite mixture structure. As d′ increases,
the major mode shifts to the left. Even though
the minor mode depends primarily on d′, it too is
14In particular, the compromised discrimination parameter is
held at d′ = 0.5.
dragged to the left as d′ increases, though to a lesser
extent than the major mode.
7. DISCUSSION
7.1 Levers and Implications
Section 6.3.2 demonstrates that the network
user’s beliefs regarding the frequency of receiving
spear-phishing emails is a theoretically effective
‘lever’ with which to influence the distribution
of security breaches. This lever is formalized as
the network user’s prior probability p that any
one email is of the spear-phishing type. In turn
Section 6.3.3 demonstrates the effect of the network
user’s discrimination parameter d
′
on the distri-
bution of security breaches. And controlling the
transition from uncompromised discrimination d
′
to
compromised discrimination d ′, the parameter pi,
representing m(ξ), captures the cue-match quality of
the psychological deception ploy.
Compared to (mis)classification costs, which
tend to be a rather static feature of organizational
culture, the parameters p, d
′
and pi are in principle
responsive to organizational initiatives, training and
education.
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The model developed in this paper supplies
grounds for explicitly including and targeting these
parameters in the learning objectives of cybersecu-
rity training programs. With appropriate calibration
to a specific organization, the present modeling
framework may be used as a tool for determining
whether there is a security-risk priority order among
p, d
′
and pi, and thus for assigning learning
intervention priorities.
The frontline technical solution – spam filtering –
is more effective against phishing than against spear
phishing. However, insofar as the organization’s
email filtering becomes more effective against spear-
phishing emails, the present analysis suggests that
there are unintended consequences and that the
reduction in security breach risk may not be
concomitant with the reduction in unblocked spear-
phishing emails. The reason for this is that better
network-level spam filtering reduces the network
users’ direct exposure to phishing emails, and thus
reduces network users’ perceived prior probability p
of any one in-tray email being malicious. As shown
in Figure 6, reductions in p have a marked effect
on the distribution of security breaches. From the
standpoint of an organization’s security risk, it is
advantageous if individual network users employ an
upward-biased prior probability parameter p. This
makes it much more likely that network users will
indeed detect malicious spear-phishing emails when
an Advanced Persistent Threat campaign succeeds
in penetrating the organization’s spam filter. The
operation of spam filtering could potentially be
modified so as to maintain existing levels of technical
protection but without diminishing users’ awareness
of the frequency with which the the organization is
targeted with malicious email. Potential measures
to achieve this range from weekly status reports on
phishing and spear-phishing emails to more elaborate
systems for capturing malicious emails, selecting a
(small) subset of these emails, substituting their
malicious links and attachments with benign content,
followed by releasing the emails to their original
intended recipients. Recipients of these trapped-
cleansed-and-released emails either detect their true
nature and delete and/or report them, or they
succumb to the (now harmless) deception ploy, by
which they themselves and the Network Security
Officer are alerted of the need to increase p, revise
personal email procedures, and possibly attend
additional training.
7.2 Reference points and gains
Given that the analysis in this paper is pred-
icated on the (mis)classification cost structure in
equation (4.1), it is apt to query whether and how the
results would change if it were possible to associate
some benefit or gain with specific (mis)classifications.
But the issue of whether outcomes are coded as gains
or as losses reflects more fundamental assumptions
concerning reference-point determination.
Reference-point determination is the subject
of active theoretical and empirical investigation.
Within the PT literature, a variety of different
non-stochastic reference points have been employed:
status quo, lagged status quo, mean of the lottery,
and the certainty equivalent. The most recent, third-
generation PT has been developed with a stochastic
reference point. (47) And in a related literature
that eschews probability weighting, Ko¨szegi and
Rabin have developed a reference point that arises
from endogenously determined lagged beliefs. (45,46)
Where the reference point does not arise naturally
from the context, there is not widespread consensus
on which reference-point concept is apposite and
robust.
An arguably natural way of approaching
reference-point determination in the phishing con-
text begins with the observation that the user
ultimately has only two actions to choose from:
Read and Don’t Read. Each action defines its own
reference point. Where the user decides to Read,
(i) the payoff under ¬D is the reference-point payoff
of zero, while (ii) the payoff under D is the loss
LR ∈ R+. Where the user opts for Don’t Read,
(iii) the payoff under D is the reference-point payoff
of zero, while (iv) the payoff under ¬D is the loss
LDR ∈ R+ (LR > LDR). Using the editing rule of
‘combining’ (a.k.a. coalescing), we may write the PT
value of each action as:
V −(Read) = −λw−(pβθ′)v−(LR)
− λ[1− w−(pβθ′)]v−(0) (7.1)
V −(Don’t Read) = −λw−((1−p)αθ′)v−(LDR)
− λ[1− w−((1−p)αθ′)]v−(0) (7.2)
Then the optimal cutoff threshold θ∗ can be found as
the θ′ that equalizes the PT value of the Read option
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with the PT value of the Don’t Read option.
w−(pβθ∗)v
−(LR) = w
−((1−p)αθ∗)v−(LDR) ,
∂ α
∂ θ′
< 0 ,
∂ β
∂ θ′
> 0 . (7.3)
Then the user’s optimal decision is to Read if θ ≤ θ∗
and Don’t Read if θ > θ∗. Despite the altered
approach to determining reference points, payoffs
remain within the domain of losses.
Richard Thaler introduced the notion that small
gains kept separate from larger losses provide a silver
lining that is absent if the gains are netted with the
losses. (48) In turn Jarnebrant et al. show that, under
the PT value function, “segregating a small gain from
a larger loss results in greater psychological value
than does integrating them into a smaller loss.” (49)
So potentially there may be scope for network
administrators to institute policies that bring about
such segregation of small gains from losses/costs,
with the objective of guiding – technically, ‘nudging’
– users’ email-classification behavior.
Notice that, holding other factors constant in
(7.3), the θ′ must move to the left, making βθ′
smaller and αθ′ bigger, in order to compensate for
LR > LDR. Potentially, one could segregate a small
gain GDR such that L
′
DR − GDR = LDR. Then,
under Don’t Read when ¬D obtains, rather than
incurring the single (loss) payoff of LDR, the user
receives the mixed payoff L′DR and GDR. According
to the silver lining effect, this has a less extreme PT
value than LDR alone, entailing additional leftward-
shifting of θ′ before equality between V −(Read) and
V −(Don’t Read) is reached.
This brief analysis suggests that a scheme to
offer users a partial reimbursement of the delay and
inconvenience incurred in diverting falsely suspected
emails through a robust screening system may have
the desired effect of reducing reporting thresholds.
Notice that unlike analyses based on normative
rationality – which recommend increased penalties
for False Negatives and decreased penalties for
False Positives – here the manipulation of payoffs
introduces no net change, is focused on False
Positives alone, and has an entirely behavioral
transmission mechanism.
7.3 Action points
The foregoing suggests action points for training
and administration policy as well as for further study
and investigation.
Training is suggested for all three variables iden-
tified as key levers: the prior probability p, discrim-
ination d(·, ·, Eit), and the match-quality mapping
m. Unlike training to set the prior probability p at
an effective level, training to increase discrimination
d(·, ·, Eit) and to restrict match quality m is likely to
suffer from attackers’ ability to ‘move the goalposts’.
Given the scope that attackers have for changing the
nature of phishing emails, training may be consigned
to a trailing position. However, this simply means
that training needs to be flexible, responsive, and
delivered in frequency-quantity combinations that
are fit for purpose.
Two administration-policy action points are
noteworthy. First, selective release of messages from
the trapped stream of phishing emails, suitably
cleansed of malicious content, may be introduced
to stoke users’ alertness and to increase their prior
probability parameter. Second, nudge policies may
be developed which exploit particular features of
the behavioral nature of users’ decision making. For
instance the silver lining effect, applied to False
Positives, is expected to lower the cutoff threshold
θ∗ and to increase detection and reporting rates.
Although previous studies have not evaluated
the sort of nudge policy outlined here, several
investigations have observed that conventional pay-
off manipulations are less effective than prior-
probability manipulations in moving the cutoff
threshold. (28,50) Jeremy Wolfe’s research group has
found that in the airport security screening context,
brief periods of full-feedback detection training under
high prevalence conditions successfully shifts the
cutoff threshold, and that this shift persists when
the prevalence rate returns to normal levels. (50)
Action points for further study and investigation
revolve around calibration of the model. As a first
follow-on step, calibration will allow quantification of
the sizes of the various effects identified in the present
work. In turn, empirical investigation may determine
how users update their prior probability estimates
with differing exposure rates to ‘cleansed’ phishing
emails. With this in hand, the optimal exposure rate
may be determined.
8. CONCLUSION
This work reprises the SDT framework for
the purpose of bottom-up modeling of system-level
risk. Whereas previous behavioral work has offered
general insights motivated by largely verbal analysis,
the present results are predicated on integrated
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mathematical modeling of the consequences of PT-
based behavioral decision making. Cognate work on
deception, trust and detection has increased our
understanding of the psychology of phishing (7,9,8,10)
– and this understanding underpins improved tech-
nical and procedural protocols – but it leaves open
the question of how to model the individual-level
decision making in a manner compatible with the
requirements for system-level risk modeling.
This paper shows that, once augmented with
a behavioral PT-based objective function, SDT
can viably fulfil this role. In turn the findings
of the psychological work on deception, trust and
detection may naturally be interpreted in terms
of the discrimination parameter d ′ of SDT, which
determines the curvature of the ROC curve and its
coverage of the unit square, i.e. the Area Under the
Curve (AUC). As proof of the concept, all of these
effects have been modeled not only mathematically
for a single decision maker, but also numerically
at the system level through an Agent-Based Model
implementation.
Going forward, one may model and represent
the matching between detection skills and specific
phishing formats with these analytical concepts,
including changes in the quality of the match due
to (a) strategic manipulation of the phishing email’s
properties by the attacker, and, on the part of the
users, (b) detection training and learning to influence
discrimination and (c) emotion regulation skills
training to influence the effectiveness of psychology-
of-deception ploys.
Furthermore, as SDT is explicitly built around
the matrix of (mis)classification costs, it ensures
consistent treatment of all four of these cost
items. Using the PT-SDT formulation with neo-
additive probability weighting function, it is also
straightforward to evaluate the effects of changes in
incentives – via the (mis)classification cost matrix
– on the optimal cutoff thresholds employed by
behavioral lay agents, with a view to aggregating this
up to system-level risk.
The present work demonstrates the materiality
of incorporating individual-level behavioral biases
into the analysis of system-level risk, for example
network security risk. (4) The PT-SDT model with
neo-additive probability weighting function is a
tractable means of doing so.
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APPENDIX
Probability (weighted) term in the iso-V −(C)
contour slope expression
Here is the full form of the TK92 probability
weighting term appearing in (4.6),
(
ψ1(α,β|p,δ)
ψ2(α,β|p,δ)
)
:
ψ1(α, β|p, δ) =
(1 + p(−1 + (1−β)))(−1 + (1−β))
× ((1 + p(−1 + (1−β)))δ + (p− p(1−β))δ) 1+δδ
×
(
(−1 + p)(−1 + α)(p+ α− pα)2δ(−1 + δ)
+ ((−1 + p)(−1 + α)(p+ α− pα))δ
× (p+ α− pα+ (−1 + p)(−1 + α)δ)
)
(A.1)
and
ψ2(α, β|p, δ) =(
(p− p(1−β))δ(−1 + α)(−p+ (−1 + p)α)
× (((−1 + p)(−1 + α))δ + (p+ α− pα)δ) 1+δδ )
×
(
(p− p(1−β))δ − ((1 + p(−1 + (1−β)))δ
+(p− p(1−β))δ)
× (p(−1 + (1−β))(−1 + δ) + δ)
)
(A.2)
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Derivation with neo-additive probability
weighting function
Substitute the neo-additive probability weight-
ing function wn-a(p) from (4.8) into equation (4.5)
V −(C) =
− [apβ + b]λ[v−(CFN)− v−(CTP)]
− [ap+ b]λ[v−(CTP)− v−(CFP)]
− [a(p+ (1−p)α) + b]λ[v−(CFP)− v−(CTN)]
− λv−(CTN) . (A.3)
The total differential of this expression, set to zero:
apλ[v−(CFN)− v−(CTP)]dTPL
− a(1− p)λ[v−(CFP)− v−(CTN)]dFPL = 0 (A.4)
from which λ and a cancel out, giving the slope of
the iso-V −n-a(C) contours as
dTPL
dFPL
=
[
v−(CFP)− v−(CTN)
v−(CFN)− v−(CTP)
]
·
(
1− p
p
)
(A.5)
consistent with (4.9).
Mathematical ingredients for the
system-level model
The system-level aggregation model takes differ-
ent discrimination parameter d′ ≥ 0 values as inputs,
combines these with misclassification cost matrix
values, and computes the associated optimal cutoff
threshold θ∗, from which the associated optimal true
positive (1−β∗) and false positive α∗ likelihoods are
computed, which in turn are used repeatedly in the
Agent-Based Model by each agent.
For score values θ drawn from normal sampling
distributions for ¬D and D, the true positive and
false positive likelihoods may be written in terms
of the standard normal Cumulative Distribution
Function
Φ(x) =
1√
2pi
∫ x
−∞
e−
1
2 z
2
d z (A.6)
for arbitrary cutoff thresholds θ′ as:
(1−β) = Φ
(
µD − θ′
σD
)
,
α = Φ
(
µ¬D − θ′
σ¬D
)
. (A.7)
In this bi-normal case, the AUC has the form
AUC = Φ
(
µD − µ¬D√
σ2
D
+ σ2
¬D
)
, (A.8)
and therefore with identical unit standard deviations
σD = σ¬D = 1, AUC= Φ
(
d′√
2
)
.
Maintaining the identical unit standard devia-
tion assumption, the slope of the bi-normal ROC
curve is
d(1−β)
dα
= exp
{(
θ′ − µ¬D
σ
− d
′
2
)
d′
}
. (A.9)
The right-hand side of (A.9) may be equated with the
slope of iso-expected-cost lines (3.3) for normative
decision makers or the slope of iso-V −n-a(C) lines (4.9)
for behavioral decision makers, in order to solve for
the respective optimal cutoff threshold θ∗. Noting
further that we may set µ¬D = 0 without loss of
generality, it follows that d′ = µD and that for
normative decision makers
θ∗ =
1
µD
(
ln(CFP − CTN)− ln(CFN − CTP)
+ ln(1− p)− ln p+ µ
2
D
2
)
. (A.10)
This cutoff threshold may be substituted back into
(A.7) to obtain (1− β∗) and α∗. For PT decision
makers, the corresponding equation is
θ∗ =
1
µD
(
ln[ (CFP)
φ− − (CTN)φ
−
]
− ln[ (CFN)φ
− − (CTP)φ
−
]
+ ln(1− p)− ln p+ µ
2
D
2
)
. (A.11)
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